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PART I:  THE CONCEPT PLAN 
 
 
 
Plum Creek’s “Concept Plan” is a petition requesting LURC to rezone approximately 
426,000 acres in the Moosehead Lake area.  According to LURC’s fact sheet, a 
concept plan is a landowner-created, long-range plan of the “landowner’s intent”, a 
flexible alternative to traditional subdivision and development plans.  It is not a 
business plan, a project plan, or a concrete real estate development plan.  Webster’s 
unabridged dictionary defines “concept” as a “thought”, “an idea,” a “notion”, which is 
precisely what Plum Creek’s concept plan is--a thought, an idea, a scheme (plan) for 
making, arranging or doing something, having in mind a purpose. 
 
The question arises, what idea, what scheme and for what purpose is Plum Creek’s 
Concept Plan submitted to LURC?  To obtain answers to this question, we first turn to 
the report by Charles S. Colgan entitled “Estimated Economic Impacts of Implementing 
the Proposed 2006 Plum Creek Rezoning Plan in the Moosehead Lake Area”.  To his 
credit Dr. Colgan writes at the outset that “since the Plan only proposes a zoning 
change, it is not what development will take place and at what pace” (p5, Colgan, 
2006).  He goes on to state that the “possible consequences”, “possible development”  
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of the “proposed plan approved and implemented as envisioned” are based upon 
“reasonable assumptions”.  He then proceeds to provide “estimates” of the increase in 
regional income, employment and taxes, which would result from rezoning based 
upon numerous assumptions and an econometric model.  There are more than forty 
(40) assumptions cited in Colgan’s 2006 report and nearly the same number of 
“would” be’s with an implied “if” the assumptions hold and the Concept Plan is 
approved by LURC. 
 
 
For example, despite Dr. Colgan’s disclaimer above that Plum Creek’s “Concept Plan 
is not what development will take place and at what pace” he goes on to report that “in 
the proposed development” “all lots are assumed to be sold and developed.”  (p.15, 
Colgan, 2006).  Finally, his summary Table 15 “Contributions of Elements of the Plum 
Creek Plan to Total Economic Impacts” provides numerical estimates of employment, 
income and taxes for the years 2010, 2020 and 2030 in the region for this non-
development plan.  These are indeed impressive “presumed” benefits for a non-plan, 
a concept plan [“an idea, a thought”] with little or no costs to Plum Creek or Maine 
mentioned.  In Dr. Colgan’s May 2007 revision of his Economic Impact Report, he 
changes some of his assumptions, which, by definition, changes the estimated, 
presumed benefits of the Plum Creek “Concept Plan”.  For example, in this latest 
revision, there is no “industrial facility” (sawmill) and wage and salary estimates are 
substituted for personal income estimates.  The time frame is also changed to yearly 
estimates and the year to 2008 to 2016.  (Colgan, 2007).   As every economist knows, 
a change of assumption “A” will change the “impacts” B, but not the reality on the 
ground.  Moreover, it is a truism of economics that all economic changes such as Plum 
Creek’s proposed land rezoning incurs costs as well as benefits.  In addition, those 
who benefit are usually not the same individuals who bear these costs. 
 
Section II of my testimony will report on the true, expected costs of Plum Creek’s 
Concept Plan and LURC land rezoning – without these assumptions or estimated 
economic benefits of hypothetical development.   
 
This Concept Plan is purely hypothetical, and therefore does not warrant detailed 
scrutiny or evaluation since no evidence is presented that it will come to pass.  Indeed, 
Colgan admits as much when he writes “Plum Creek has also indicated that it does not 
intend to be, itself, the developer of a forest industrial facility or tourist facilities [or 
residential housing].  The rezoning plan only provides the zones where such uses 
would be permitted.” (p.9, Colgan, 2007)  Therefore, Colgan here explicitly states that 
Plum Creek’s Concept Plan is not the “landowners’ intent.”  Rather, to Dr. Colgan’s 
professional merit he states in his 2007 report that: 
 
“This analysis must be considered illustrative of the types and levels of changes 
in economic activity that may result for the [assumed] development that would be 
enabled if Plum Creek’s rezoning request were approved……rather than a 
forecast of actual specific events.”  (p. 3, Colgan, 2007). 
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The fact that there are two revisions of Dr. Colgan’s Economic Impact Reports of Plum 
Creek’s Concept Plan (2005, 2006, 2007) with different assumptions and different 
estimates of the economic benefits—without estimates of the costs—confirm the 
assertion that these are simply hypothetical exercises, wishful thinking, concepts and 
not real, concrete plans to be taken seriously. 
 
Thus, Dr. Colgan’s estimated economic benefits resulting from “development” are 
neither planned, proposed nor programmed by Plum Creek or anyone else—they are 
merely assumed to occur.  It appears ironic that LURC would approve rezoning the 
land in question based upon such scant facts, without a real foundation.  It would be 
more appropriate for LURC to assume little construction or economic development in 
the Moosehead region, since, in fact, there is nothing concrete upon which to predict 
otherwise. 
 
Perhaps LURC should closely study Plum Creek’s last such “development” 
project/plan on First Roach Pond where approximately eighty house lots (waterfront 
and inland) were sold.  It is said that the lots sold like “hotcakes” and all have had 
houses constructed since they were sold.  The reality is otherwise.  Perhaps 25 
percent of these lots have construction on them and even some of these are 
speculative constructions by building contractors, according to local real estate 
agencies.  It would be in LURC’s interest to investigate this reality of this Plum Creek 
land speculation instead of its hypothetical Concept Plan before rezoning the 
Moosehead Lake Region. 
 
Indeed, one cannot, in good faith, come to any other conclusion and Dr. Colgan admits 
as much when he writes at the beginning of his report that which should have been 
placed at the end, namely: 
 
“This analysis is presented as an aid in decision making, and not a 
specific forecast of the future economy of the region…..Given the 
assumptions used, this analysis should be considered a guide to 
possible effects from [assumed] development rather than a definitive 
statement of a specific future outcome”. (p.8 Colgan, 2006) 
 
In short, LURC has no alternative other than to base its decision upon other more 
factual information than that provided in Colgan’s report, which is, in itself, an abstract 
exercise, a thought, an idea.  No real construction gives rise to no real employment, 
and no real income from this hypothetical economic activity—and this is not an 
assumption, but a fact.  This is a fitting conclusion of the economic analysis of the Plum 
Creek Concept Plan as envisioned or intended (planned) by the landowner.  Now we 
turn to a more concrete, realistic economic analysis of the real objectives and 
measurable consequences of Plum Creek ’s land rezoning proposal—a definitive 
analysis of a specific future outcome of land rezoning for Plum Creek in the 
Moosehead area and for the remainder of the Unorganized Territories, which together 
comprise approximately half of the entire state of Maine.  
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The Predictable Consequences of Rezoning 
 
 
 
What can we then expect from the Plum Creek Concept Plan if, in fact, LURC approves 
rezoning the land as proposed?  Who benefits economically and how?  Who loses 
economically and how?  These are the questions addressed in the following economic 
analysis.  Throughout, one must bear in mind that there will be little or none of the 
construction of residential housing or tourist facilities envisioned by Plum Creek and 
assumed in Dr. Colgan’s reports.  In lieu of additional, more concrete information, it is 
safe to predict that the future of the Moosehead Lake region, if the rezoning is 
approved by LURC, will reflect extrapolated past trends in every respect, including the 
impact upon land values, property taxes and leasing fees. 
 
 
How does one know what will happen in the future?  One can only surmise that Dr. 
Colgan’s assumed construction has no basis in fact and therefore will not take place 
as “planned.”  Plum Creek’s Concept Plan is therefore a best-case scenario concocted 
to obtain land rezoning for speculative purposes and little else.  Moreover, my 
expectation is not assumed but based on the fact that there is no Plum Creek 
construction or development plan.  LURC should be cautious in its decision-making 
and base its decision on facts not unrealistic assumptions and “best case" scenarios. 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II:  LAND VALUES, TAX ASSESSMENTS AND LEASING FEES 
 
 
 
Regardless of what Plum Creek’s Plans and Colgan’s reports assume will occur 
should LURC approve the rezoning of its land in the Moosehead Lake Region, the 
reality of what actually will occur is quite distinct and not based upon the assumptions 
of Plum Creek’s Concept Plan but rather upon past as well as present behavior of all 
parties involved. We begin by noting that the big landowners in Maine have recently 
switched from being solely timber suppliers for the wood industry to sellers of 
wilderness land as well.  Neil Rolde, in his excellent book The Interrupted Forest, 
documents that in the 1990s some 3.3 million acres [of forest land] had changed 
hands in Maine.” (p. 35-41, Rolde).  It should be kept in mind that since the Indian 
Land Claims Settlement in 1980, these land deeds have been “unclouded” and they 
are now free to sell these lands, as was not the case before. 
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This Maine Indian Land Claims settlement made it possible for the land speculation 
that we see today in Maine’s Unorganized Territories by making it feasible for Plum 
Creek and others to purchase large tracts of heretofore forest lands and resell them, 
especially lakefront lots, for huge speculative profits. 
 
 
The demand for pristine Maine waterfront land lots has increased due to the increase 
in population nation-wide and the increasing unequal distribution of income and 
wealth.  More people want and can afford to speculate on the few lots, which have 
been offered for sale over the last two decades. 
 
The supply of such lots on the market, however, has not kept pace with demand as the 
large land speculators have a vested interest in selling only a small portion of their 
land to push up the price as illustrated in the below graph.  The supply of land made 
available for sale in this graph is only a small portion of the land owned by the large 
speculators, held in tree growth tax status and only released for sale piecemeal so as 
to increase the price of all their lands. In short, when Plum Creek seeks a rezoning of 
only a small portion of their properties and offers for sale only 975 house lots they can 
reasonably expect to get a price of $80,000, $100,000 and $125,000 for these lots, 75 
sold each year over the next 13 years.  However, if First Roach Pond is any guide, one 
cannot expect that nearly 90 percent of these lots will be built upon—as assumed. 
 
As we can see in the graph below, it is in the interest of these land speculators to 
increase the supply of these lots very little so as to raise the marginal value (price) of 
these lots sold and unsold, as well as raise the “fair market value” of tax assessed lots 
of their leaseholders since the State tax assessments are the foundation for the price 
of their leases, a fact not mentioned by Plum Creek in its Concept Plan. 
 
 
 
The large land speculators do not pay a property tax on much of their waterfront land 
because it is taxed separately as “tree growth” at an average of $1 to $1.50 per acre 
until such time as they subdivide it for speculative purposes and sell it. The penalty for 
withdrawing from the “tree growth” tax status is nominal and is passed on to the house 
lot buyers.  Limited, marginal rezoning and small house lot sales enable the large land 
speculators like Plum Creek to increase the value of all their land without themselves 
paying property taxes.  Indeed, Plum Creek’s CEO Rick Holley is quoted in Smart 
Money as saying, in stump speeches to investors that “it’s not just trees, it’s the 
underlying value of the land.”   
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This raises the second major component of land speculation in Maine besides the 
Indian Land Settlement of 1980.  Most of the land, real property of the large land 
speculators like Plum Creek is subject to the low Tree Growth tax and exempt from the 
Unorganized Territorial Education and Service Tax (M.R.  S.A. 1601-1610 (1990 & 
Supp. 1994).  However, their small leaseholders and other small lakefront property 
owners are largely non-exempt and subject to a uniform State property tax in the 
Unorganized Territories based upon “Fair Market Value” assessments and a uniform 
mill rate.  While it is called an “equitable taxation of property” it is, in fact, 
discriminatory.  For example, despite the fact that the large land speculators like Plum 
Creek cannot harvest lumber on an acre back from lake fronts, this land is determined 
to be exempt from the much higher property tax and only subject to the low Tree  
Growth Tax until such time as they lease it, sell it or otherwise remove it from the Tree 
Growth Tax for speculative purposes. 
 
Over the last decade, it is a fact that the State has increased the assessed “fair market 
value” of the land of small house lot owners and leaseholders’ plots by 100% to 200% 
-- based upon a very small number of house lot purchases and sales in the very large  
unorganized territories of the State of Maine.  Approximately 1300 such buy and sell 
transactions have been used by the State tax officials to determine the “fair market 
value” of these house lots which are then taxed and leased accordingly.  The large 
landholders who lease these house lots such as Plum Creek, then pass on this tax to 
their leaseholders as well as use this higher tax assessed house lots to increase their 
annual lease fees. 
 
There are an estimated 6000 such leaseholders in the Unorganized Territories of 
Maine and a smaller undetermined number of small house lot owners affected by this 
tax of approximately $400 per acre – but not the bulk of the large land speculators’ 
properties like those of Plum Creek which, as mentioned above, is taxed separately at 
a much lower “tree growth” tax rate.  The large land speculators then pass on this tax 
increase to those who buy their house lots and increase the fees of their leased lots 
based upon a percentage of this higher tax assessed value, increasing their lease 
fees to $3000 per lot and more. Moreover, the land speculators, such as Plum Creek, 
do not offer to sell their leased properties in large numbers to the leaseholders since 
placing 6000 lots on the market would increase the supply and thus depress the price 
of their lands as well as eliminate their “cash cow” leases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this regard, it is interesting to note that large landowners reported in a survey 
conducted by the Committee to Study Issues Concerning Changes to the Traditional 
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Uses of Maine Forests and Lands (December 2001, 120th Legislature) that “only a few 
leases have actually been terminated in recent years”….”Landowners have adjusted 
lease fees based on [tax) and Fair Market] valuation”, and the large landowners report 
that they are “not creating new leases.”  Plum Creek stated in this report that they have 
120 such leases on their property.  Dr. Colgan, in his report states that “real estate 
values are assumed to be held constant in 2005 dollars.” (p.15, Colgan, 2006) and 
that “property taxes in the Unorganized Territories could fall by as much as one quarter 
at full build out of the Plum Creek proposal.” (p.16, Colgan)  One fails to see how he 
can arrive at such a conclusion inasmuch as the 975 house lots Plum Creek proposes 
to sell would nearly double the 1300 lots presently used by the State to determine “Fair 
Market Value” for property tax assessments in the Unorganized Territories.  It is 
assumed that the Plum Creek lots are to be sold at $80,000 to $125,000 per lot, which 
is far in excess of similar properties currently tax assessed at $50,000-$60,000 per 
lake front property.  Needless to say, the State’s discriminatory land taxation and 
selective rezoning fuels land speculation in Maine, redistributes income and wealth 
unequally and does not promote economic development or increase employment and 
income. 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the large landowner speculators like Plum Creek and its shareholders are the 
only beneficiaries of these State tax and rezoning policies, both of which increase the 
land prices, the value of land assets and stock price of the large land speculators like 
Plum Creek at the expense of everyone else.  This interpretation, like everything else 
presented in this short analysis, is not an assumption or an abstract “concept” but 
rather is based upon observed behavior of all parties involved – in the past and 
presently on the ground.  LURC cannot realistically expect anything different in the 
future should it decide to rezone the Plum Creek land in the Moosehead Lake Region. 
 
 
 
This type of market is classic land speculation, which is older than capitalism, and 
there is nothing “fair” about these prices, which are controlled and manipulated by the 
large land speculators to drive up the price of their land and other such land in Maine 
as well as the fees of their leaseholders and other leaseholders statewide.  It 
increases the price of all such land and thus tax assessments and therefore lease 
fees.  No real investments are made to the land, no, or very little, construction, 
employment or income is generated in the process.  Indeed, such oligopolistic market 
manipulation is never in the public interest.  Such land speculation only benefits these 
rentiers at the expense of everyone else except perhaps the State, which also benefits 
in the short run from increased tax revenues.  Everyone else looses and what occurs is 
a redistribution of income and wealth from the people to the big land speculators such 
as Plum Creek. 
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If this land speculation and lot price increase, in play with the State’s increased tax 
assessments of these properties and leaseholder lots, continues, the 6000 modest 
income families who have had small cabins and leases on their lots for generations 
will eventually be priced out of the market and lose their heritage.  Modest and low-
income families in Maine will also henceforth be denied lakefront property as they are 
now largely excluded from the coastal waterfront lot market.  Is this the objective of 
land speculators like Plum Creek and is this what LURC or the people of the State of 
Maine want? 
 
In the short run, the cost of this land speculation and manipulation of prices is born by 
the leaseholders of waterfront lots and other small lot owners of which there are very 
few in Maine as noted above. 
 
In the long run, the State also loses, since the short-run (current) tax policy aids and 
abets this land speculation, which cannot be the “best” use of its forestlands.  Land 
speculation of this type only benefits the large landowners and is a manipulation of the 
market, which is unfair, unjust and unwise.  “Fair market value”, the “sanctity of 
contracts” and “equitable taxation” under these conditions is a distortion of the terms. 
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